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0002-9ture. Decisions about jobs are modeled as a choice over different tenure-
reward slopes, which are steeper for more specialized skills. The choice of
job depends on expected duration. Individuals have imperfect informa-
tion about their probability of success in different jobs and form expec-
tations partly by observing the social context. Because women face
greater constraints anduncertainties thanmen, their choices dependmore
on this context. Contextual influences on job specialization are tested for
European respondents nested in 234 different regions. Consonant with
the theory’s predictions, women are found to have more specialized jobs
in regions where (1) the preceding generation’s job specialization di-
verged less by gender, (2) peers arrange a more equal division of house-
work, and (3) peers have fewer children. None of these contextual vari-
ables have significant effects on men.ite the impressive gains in women’s educational attainment achieved
e last few decades throughout the industrialized world (see, e.g.,Buchmann, DiPrete, and McDaniel 2008; Breen et al. 2010), today female
workers continue to be overrepresented in jobs that offer comparatively
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fewer opportunities for skill advancement (see, e.g., Royalty 1996; Knoke
and Ishio 1998; Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002; Estevez-Abe 2005;
Socially Embedded InvestmentsFelstead et al. 2007, chap. 3). This has important implications for gender
stratification.
According to several estimations, gender differences in the skills that are
effectively learned in the job, henceforth referred to as job-specific or special-
ized skills, could account for most of the statistical effect of occupational sex
composition on earnings (Tam 1997; Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002;
Polavieja 2008, 2009). The reason is that female-dominated occupations
show lower average levels of skill specialization, while skill specialization in-
creases wages (see, e.g., Dustmann andMeghir 2005; Buchinsky et al. 2010).
The acquisition of specialized skills in the job also enhances promotion op-
portunities within firms as well as the chances of experiencing upward job
mobility (see, e.g., Veum 1997; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1999). Hence gen-
der differences in job specialization also have important consequences for
cumulative career success. Understanding why women are matched to jobs
with lower levels of skill specialization is therefore a crucial task for gender
stratification research (see, e.g., Reskin 1993; Tam1997; Tomaskovic-Devey
and Skaggs 2002).
Many demand-side explanations have examined the impact of discrimi-
nation processes at the point of hiring, promoting, and training femalework-
ers (see, e.g., Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002; Petersen and Saporta
2004; Mun 2010). Supply-side approaches have stressed instead the role of
preferences and expectations as key drivers of gender differences in job al-
location (see, e.g., Becker 1993, chap. 3; Marini et al. 1996; Tam 1997; Hakim
2000). This study proposes and tests empirically a new explanation for gen-
der differences in job specialization,which complements bothdiscrimination-
based and preference-based approaches. This theory focuses on the central
role that proximate social contexts play in informing individual investment
choices under uncertainty. Its main thrust is the idea that job investment
decisions involve intentional microlevel actions that are themselves influ-
enced by the social structure in which individuals are embedded, that is,
by the actions and the outcomes experienced by other actors. The greater
the uncertainty and the informational constraints actors face when ponder-
ing different investment options, and the greater the risks involved in the
investment decision itself, the more likely it will be that they draw on their
social contexts in search for clues. Women face greater constraints and un-
certainties than men and confront harsher work-family trade-offs. This
makes their investment choices particularly receptive to the social environ-
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ment. Learning from the aggregate introduces the social structure in the in-
dividual investment decision, and this can lead to marked sex differences in
American Journal of Sociologyjob specialization even in the face of declining discrimination and prefer-
ence convergence between the sexes.
Although there is a substantive body of research investigating social in-
fluences on educational attainment (see, e.g., Crane 1991; Brooks-Gunn et al.
1993; Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999; DeLuca and Dayton 2009), very
little research, if at all, has been devoted to analyzing social influences on
postschooling skill investments, least of all from a gender stratification per-
spective.2 This study helps to fill this gap by testing different empirical pre-
dictions that are derived from the proposed theoretical model. Under uncer-
tainty and information constraints, individual job investment decisions are
expected to be influenced by any social signal that facilitates career fore-
casting. Of crucial importance to the investment decision is the assessment
of job disruption risks. I posit that women can forecast such risks by observ-
ing (at least) three types of contextual signals: (1) the extent of gender differ-
ences in job specialization in preceding generations, (2) the domestic behav-
ior of men in proximate social contexts, and (3) the fertility behavior of peers.
All these macrolevel distributions can informwomen about the probability of
success in, and the expected costs of, different investment paths. I test these
empirical predictions using the second round of the European Social Survey,
ESS-2, carried out between 2004 and 2005 to a representative sample of
over 45,600 individuals, nested in 234 different regions and 24 different
countries. The main contribution of this study is to address, both theoretically
and empirically, the social “embeddedness” of job-specific investments.
SOCIALLY EMBEDDED INVESTMENTS AS A BRIDGE IN
THE LITERATUREDemand-side explanations stress the role that discrimination and social clo-
sure play in hindering women’s access to firm-provided training (see, e.g.,
Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002; Petersen and Saporta 2004; Mun
2010). According to these theories, gender differences in specialized skills
would be the result of the active role that more powerful individuals actors
(i.e., male employers, male coworkers, andmale supervisors) play in exclud-
2Cotter et al. (1997) study the microlevel impact of occupational sex integration. They
show that greater integration in local labor markets is associated with lower gender wage
inequality at the individual level. This effect is found even for women employed in pre-
dominantly female occupations. The authors posit, but do not test, that the benefits of
macrolevel integration are transmitted to the individual level through occupational de-
crowding, changes in people’s expectations induced by the increasing visibility of women
in previously male-dominated occupations, and the rise in women’s managerial power
(p. 715).
594
ing status inferiors (i.e., women) from the best and most desired jobs, which
tend to be those requiring specific training (Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs
Socially Embedded Investments2002, p. 109). Discrimination approaches have provided empirical evidence
thatfirms aremore likely to trainmaleworkers (see alsoEvertsson 2004; Fer-
nandez and Sosa 2005; Cohen andHuffman 2007; Castilla 2008; Fernandez-
Mateo 2009). Gender discrimination has been documented even for highly
competitive sectors where performance-based reward systems are allegedly
the norm (Roth 2006).
Social closure and discrimination approaches focus on firm-level processes.
Yet discriminatory practices may also have consequences that go beyond the
confines of single organizations. As any other social process leading to the
underrepresentation of women in highly specialized jobs, firm-level dis-
crimination could have significant macrolevel effects because such under-
representation signals other women that there are gender-specific barriers
and constraints associated with job specialization. As I explain below, this
signaling effect, which has been largely overlooked in the social-closure lit-
erature, could exert a significant influence on the investment behavior of
women inposterior generations (seeBreen andGarcia-Penalosa 2002).Draw-
ing attention to macrolevel signaling effects can help us connect demand-
side processes to supply-side decisions.
Standard supply-side explanations of gender differences in postschooling
investments stress the role of individual preferences and expectations. The
main thrust of human capital theory is the assertion that women face higher
opportunity costs for investing in specialized training. Faced with these
costs, women will rationally choose jobs that require lower specific invest-
ments and consequently produce lower returns over time (see, e.g., Mincer
and Polachek 1974; Becker 1993, chap. 3; Tam 1997). Higher opportunity
costs for women stem from the combination of higher average household pro-
ductivity and stronger preferences for family life. Both factors lead to shorter
andmore disruptivework-life expectations (see, e.g., Blau, Ferber, andWink-
ler 1998, chap. 6).3 Supply-side approaches have been criticized for depicting
actors as atomized agents largely isolated from the social structure (see, e.g.,
England 1993; Ginn et al. 1996). Furthermore, it has been argued that this un-
dersocialized view of action too frequently leads to blaming the victim (Correll
2001).
A compatible supply-side explanation is provided by sociological theo-
ries that emphasize traditional socialization patterns leading to sphere spe-
3There is not a unified position within human capital approaches as to the origins of sex dif-
ferences in comparative advantage and work-family preferences. Becker (1998, chap. 2)
identifies biological differences as a crucial driver of sphere specialization, whereas pos-
terior formulations stress the importance of socialization processes (see, e.g., Blau et al.
1998, chap. 6).
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cialization by sex (see, e.g., Marini and Brinton 1984; Marini et al. 1996;
Crompton and Harris 1998; Okamoto and England 1999; Corrigall and
American Journal of SociologyKonrad 2007). Classic socialization approaches focus on the cultural trans-
mission of sex-specific values, norms, and orientations and investigate the
labor market consequences of holding traditional gender views (for a re-
view, see, e.g., Reskin [1993] and Reskin and Bielby [2005]). More recent
sociological contributions have drawn their attention to those processes of
social interaction that help recreate gender-specific status beliefs (Ridgeway
and Erickson 2000; Ridgeway and Correll 2004) as well as gender-biased
expectations about self-competence (Correll 2001, 2004). As shorthand, I re-
fer to these latter contributions as belief formation approaches. Belief for-
mation approaches can explain gender differences in job allocation even
under conditions of attitudinal convergence between men and women.
The theoretical approach developed in this study combines substantive
ideas of economic theory with belief formation approaches in sociology.
As in the standard human capital literature, it stresses the importance of
cost-benefit calculations at the microlevel and claims that perceived oppor-
tunity costs can in effect hinder women’s investments in the job. Yet the
model also emphasizes that these opportunity costs are always and crucially
influenced by the social structure in which individuals are embedded and
that workers must always choose among reward profiles that are designed
by employers. This implies that individual choices are just as much volun-
tary as they are constrained. As in belief formation approaches, the model
focuses on the social construction of expectations through interactional pro-
cesses and stresses the pervasive influence of gender (see also Ridgeway
1997, 2011; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999). The interactional processes
stressed in this study are those that affect job-specific skill investments by
providing actors with clues about their job survival probabilities in differ-
ent investment paths. The analytical emphasis is therefore placed on how
social structures at the macrolevel affect sex-specific individual behavior at
the microlevel, that is, on the socially embedded nature of economic action
(Granovetter 1985, 2005).
JOB-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXTJob-Specific Skills
Job-specific skills (JSS) capture the knowledge needed to perform the tasks
that define a given job and that workers do not possess prior to entering the
employment relation. JSS are therefore directly linked to job complexity.
From this standpoint, jobs can be viewed as “skill packages” or “training
slots” (as in Thurow [1975]). In other words, jobs can be defined by their
specific skill content. This means that when workers are matched to differ-
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ent jobs, they are actually placed in different skill investment paths. High-
JSS investment paths often take the form of a job ladder in which the bulk
Socially Embedded Investmentsof JSS investments are concentrated on the first slots and job complexity in-
creases as workers move up. JSS can be acquired through both formal and
informal training schemes provided by the firm or simply via learning by
doing. In accordance with new training models in economics, JSS are seen
as encompassing all the new skills that are learned in the job, including both
firm-specific and transferable skills (for a review see Leuven [2005]). In all
cases, learning JSS are costly for both workers and their firms and consti-
tute an important source of contractual hazard.
Supply-Side Investment DecisionsInvestments in JSS produce increasing returns over tenure. This seems awell-
established empirical regularity (see, e.g., Brown1989;Topel 1991;Dustmann
andMeghir 2005; Buchinsky et al. 2010). According to standard human cap-
ital theory, steep tenure-earning profiles reflect increasing gains in workers’
productivity, combined with reduced wages during the training period.4 In
contrast, agency theories of compensation see steep reward profiles as re-
flecting employers’ strategies to minimize skill-related contractual hazard
rather than productivity gains (see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1990; Flabbi and
Ichino 2001; Zwick 2009). Lazear (1995) shows that the optimum incentive-
compatible compensation scheme is one in which workers receive below-
productivity wages at the beginning of the employment relation (which is
when most of JSS training takes place) in exchange for above-productivity
wages at the end. This increases the costs of job quitting for trained workers
while simultaneously reducing their incentives to shirk.5 Additional evidence
that job specialization increases the steepness of the tenure-earning profiles is
provided in an online supplement.
Tenure-reward profiles define the opportunity structure that employees
face when pondering different job investment options. For simplicity, let us
assume that there are only two types of jobs in the economy: jobs that re-
quire no skill investments (L) and jobs that require high skill investments
4According to Becker (1993, chap. 3), if skills are firm specific, workers will get an addi-
tional posttraining wage premium to reduce their turnover. This will make their reward
slope even steeper.
5This view of compensation as an incentive-enhancing device resonates well with con-
temporary sociological thinking in organizational theory (see, e.g., Fligstein 1996; West-
ern 1998) and class theory (see, e.g., Sorensen 1994, 2000; Breen 1997; Goldthorpe 2000,
pp. 206–29; Polavieja 2005). The idea that strategic compensation provides firms with a
rational solution to skill-related risks entails no strong presumption that all firms will be-
have rationally at all times. In fact, we know that firms often do not (see, e.g., DiPrete,
Eirich, and Pittinsky 2010).
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(H ). In the former type, individuals are employed to use their general pre-
market skills acquired through schooling. In the latter type, employees are
FIG. 1.—Relation between returns to effort (R) and tenure (t) for high-specialization
(H ) and low-specialization (L) jobs.
American Journal of Sociologytrained to learn new skills that are specific to the job, although not necessar-
ily to the firm. Training inH-type jobs can be formal or informal. In all in-
stances learning new skills requires some amount of effort. Skill-related ef-
fort will decrease over time as individuals acquire JSS, whereas returns will
increase as workers accumulate tenure. The expected returns over effort for
these two ideal types of jobs are represented graphically in figure 1.
Individual iwill choose jobH over jobL if his or her expected returns (de-
fined asmonetary gains over exerted effort) in jobH (RH ) are greater than his
or her expected returns in job L (RL). Individuals calculate expected returns
on the basis of the observed tenure-earnings profiles of each type of job and
their expected job survival probability in the firm (t). For ease of exposition,
I assume that returns over tenure in L jobs are zero, whereas returns over
tenure in job H increase at a constant rate (b). Formally, individual i will
choose job H if
tRL < ta 1
1
2
bt2; ð1Þ
where each side of expression (1) is the reward profile of each type of job as
defined by the areas shown in figure 1.6 It is now easy to demonstrate that
6Note that 12bt
25 ½ða1 bt2aÞt=2.598
rational individuals will choose job H only if their expected probability of
survival in the job (t) exceeds a value t* since for any value below t*, returns
Socially Embedded Investmentsover tenure will be greater in job L. Formally, individuals will choose H
over L if t > t*, where7
t*5 2ðRL2aÞ=b: ð2Þ
In other words, employees’ investment choices will be crucially dependent
on their expected duration in the firm. Questions of the type “will I perform
well in the job?” or “will I last in the firm?” will now dominate the invest-
ment decision.Note that the latter question actually encompasses the former
since underperformance increases the odds of involuntary job termination.
Job survival expectations also encompass individuals’ assessments about
the expected workload, the likelihood of having to work long or unsociable
hours, or the risks of facing uncooperative or openly discriminatoryworking
environments.
Compensation profiles for JSS investments thus force workers to act on
their ownprivate information. Low-productivityworkers,workerswith low
self-confidence, and workers prone to shirk will all be put off by the reward
structure since the probability that firms detect underperformance increases
with time of service. Similarly discouraged will be those who plan job inter-
ruptions, for they will also be unable to reap the benefits of their job-specific
investments if they leave the firm too soon (i.e., at t< t*). Yet steep compen-
sation profilesmay also dispiritworkerswith high ability and self-confidence
who, not having any intention to underperform or to interrupt their employ-
ment careers, might nevertheless feel it is likely that they eventually will ex-
perience some of these risks. Individuals’ risk assessments are not indepen-
dent of the actions carried out by others. The degree of context dependence of
job disruption risks varies greatly by gender.
Gender, Social Interactions, and the Investment DecisionWomen’s job disruption risks have always been particularly dependent on
the actions of others. As explained above, documented processes of discrim-
7Expression (2) is derived as follows:0< tða2RLÞ 1 12bt
2;
0< ða2RLÞ 1 12bt;
RL2a<
1
2
bt;
t > 2ðRL2aÞ=b:
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ination and social closure have historically hindered women’s career prog-
ress. Even if such practices may have certainly declined over time, gender
American Journal of Sociologydiscrimination is far from eradicated. Furthermore, past discrimination can
still leave an observable imprint on present-day investments if women look
at the past to forecast the future (see Breen and Garcia-Penalosa [2002] and
below). Women have also faced important barriers at home. Still today, the
main cause of job disruptions and reduced work supply for women is the
unequal distribution of family responsibilities and household chores (see,
e.g., Hsueh and Tienda 1996; Han and Moen 1999; Hersch and Stratton
2002; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Fuwa 2004; Maume 2006; Cunningham
2008; Treas and Drobnic 2010). Women’s careers are therefore particularly
vulnerable to constraining shocks stemming from the private sphere.
Hence it is reasonable to expect that, in informing their investment choices,
women pay more attention to their social environments than comparable
men, since it is women who face the greatest constraints and uncertainties
as well as the harshest work-family trade-offs. Women’s investment deci-
sions are thus expected to varymarkedly depending on their social contexts.
More specifically, I posit that women can learn about their own job survival
risks in different investment paths by observing the investment experiences
of otherwomen in preceding generations (hypothesis 1), the domestic behav-
ior of men in their proximate social contexts (hypothesis 2), and the fertility
behavior of peers (hypothesis 3). All these macrolevel signals can inform
women about their own chances of success in highly specialized jobs. I now
discuss these three hypotheses in greater detail.
Learning from the PastSocial learning has been typically modeled as a process whereby the mem-
bers of a given cohort extract information from preceding generations ac-
cording to a given information-updating rule that is specified by the the-
ory (see, e.g., Breen 1999; Manski 2004).8 Several studies have posited that
women learn from previous cohorts when it comes to informing their labor
market behavior (see, e.g., Breen andGarcia-Penalosa 2002; Fernández 2007).
Building on these studies, I expect women to forecast their own job survival
opportunities in high-investment paths by observing the past investment ex-
periences of other women. More specifically, I expect women to observe the
difference between the investments made by women and those made by men
in the preceding generation, since it is relational signals of this kind that have
the largest informational content in stratified contexts. Gender differences in
JSS investments in the preceding generation are expected to inform present-
8 Information-updatingmodels typically use themaximin rule, theHurwicz rule, or, most
commonly, Bayes’s rule (for a discussion, see, e.g., Breen [1999] and Manski [2004]).
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day women about their own risks of facing gender-specific hurdles, including
demand-side barriers and supply-side constraints.
Socially Embedded InvestmentsHYPOTHESIS 1.—Social contexts in which there are only very few women
represented in high-investment occupations (relative to men) should lower
women’s job survival expectations in the posterior generation and, as a re-
sult, discourage their JSS investments. In contrast, contexts with a small
gender gap in access to high-JSS occupations should increase women’s sur-
vival expectations in the posterior generation and, in so doing, favor their
JSS investments. To the extent that men’s investment behavior is uncon-
strained by gender barriers, it should not be influenced (at least not to the
same extent) by aggregate gender differences in access to JSS at the societal
level.9
Learning from Men’s Domestic BehaviorWomen face great uncertainty regarding the extent to which potentially dis-
ruptive domestic shocks will put a curb on their labor supply in the future.
Job investment decisions often precede family formation, and this implies
that women have to foretell investment trade-offs under severe information
constraints. These constraints ultimately follow from the fact that the co-
operative nature of eventual partners cannot be fully revealed before cou-
ples are actually formed—and often not before the birth of the first child.
Women are therefore compelled to observe their social environments to
forecast the probability that they end up bearing the costs of uncooperative
behavior in the private sphere, a behavior that would impose a severe pen-
alty on their JSS investments. Women can assess this risk by observing the
domestic behavior of men in their proximate social contexts. The societal
contexts that matter here are those defining women’s potential marriage
or partnership markets as it is these markets that inform women of their
chances of eventually partnering a cooperative spouse. Note that the dis-
tribution of cooperative men in women’s marriage markets can leave an
observable trace on women’s investments regardless of their own posterior
family behavior. The reason is that many consequential job investment de-
cisions are confronted before women form their own families.
HYPOTHESIS 2.—Women living in social contexts in which there is a large
proportion of housework-cooperative men should be more likely to invest in
JSS than women living in contexts in which the majority of men deflect
housework. To the extent that the distribution of housework has never been
a major constraint on men’s careers—since nearly all women display over-
9Note that in the case in which men were influenced by previous gender differences in
JSS investments, the effect should operate in the exact opposite direction from women’s;
i.e., the lower the social visibility of women in high-JSS jobs in a given generation, the
larger men’s investments in JSS in the next.
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cooperative behavior—it is not expected that men take into consideration
the distribution of cooperative behavior in their marriage markets when
American Journal of Sociologypondering different job investment paths.
Learning from Aggregate Fertility BehaviorIndividuals learn the “proper” way to behave by observing the behavior of
their peers, for this behavior defines the social norm (Granovetter 2005).
When norms are internalized by individuals, they become part of their pref-
erences (see Akerlof and Kranton 2000). As with other preferences, internal-
ized norms may be captured (albeit imperfectly) via standard attitudinal sur-
vey research. But social norms also have an external component; that is, they
can affect agents’ behavior even when they are not internalized (Elster 1989,
chap. 12; Coleman 1990; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). The reason is that exist-
ing social norms convey consequential information about the probability of
social sanctions (rewards) and hence the costs (benefits) of each given route
of action.
Norms regarding reproductive behavior are likely to be particularly con-
sequential for women’s JSS investments, since fertility behavior is likely to
reduce women’s disposable time and effort for the job, whereas job invest-
ments are likely to reduce disposable time and energy for parenting (see,
e.g., Becker 1998, pp. 54–79; Waldfogel 1998; Budig and England 2001;
Maume 2006). Specifically, by fertility norm I mean the average number of
children that women of a given social group typically have in a particular so-
cial context. Such a number defines the social expectation for all women of
the same group living in the same context. Again, to the extent that invest-
ment choices often precede family formation, the impact of fertility norms on
women’s investments could be observable independently of women’s poste-
rior fertility behavior, particularly since fertility preferences are not always
fully realized.
HYPOTHESIS 3.—Women’s investments in JSS should be lower in high-
fertility social contexts since women in such contexts are likely to (1) inter-
nalize fertility norms that increase the expected opportunity costs of job in-
vestments (effect on preferences) or (2) fear greater sanctions in the event of
deviant fertility behavior (effect on expectations). Since it is women who
disproportionately bear the costs associated with childbearing and child
rearing, it is unlikely that men’s investments are deterred by the existing
fertility norms.
Embedded Investments and the Reproduction of Gender InequalityThe analytical distinction between social effects on preferences and social
effects on expectations bears great theoretical importance. Explanations of
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gender differences that stress the role of preferences (see, e.g., Hakim 2000)
tend to disregard the crucial role that the structures of gender inequality at
Socially Embedded Investmentsthe macrolevel play in influencing rational expectations and consequently
the behavior of women who are otherwise fully committed to their careers.
Hedström (1998) calls social influences on rational expectations cold effects.
I would argue that such cold effects capture a crucial structural property of
the gender system, namely, its capacity to reproduce itself even in the face of
attitudinal convergence between men and women. Expectations alone can
thus be powerful drivers of gender inequality.
However important in theoretical terms, distinguishing between social ef-
fects on expectations and social effects on preferences empirically is a hugely
difficult task. The reason is that individual expectations are typically not ob-
served whereas observed individual preferences are subjected to measure-
ment error. In the empirical section of this study I estimate the effects of the
three social influences of interest on individual job specialization scores us-
ing stringent controls for gender attitudes and individual orientations to-
ward social achievement. Significant effects are found for all three macro-
level influences net of these attitudinal controls. Several other attitudinal
controls for preference heterogeneity have been tested with identical results.
Yet it is important to bear in mind that the social influences of interest could
have had effects on internalized preferences and orientations that we do not
(fully) observe.
DATA AND METHODOLOGYThe Data
The comparative literature on gender stratification has typically focused on
country-level institutions andwelfare state effects (see, e.g., Chang 2000; Stier
and Lewin-Epstein 2001; Estevez-Abe 2005; Mandel and Semyonov 2005;
Polavieja 2009; for a review, see van der Lippe and van Dijk [2002]). Yet sex
differences in labor market behavior should also differ markedly within
countries, such as, for example, between Sicily and Milan, Flanders and
Wallonia, the Basque Country and Andalusia, or the Scottish Highlands
and London. Since the central concern of this study is to investigate how
social structures affect individuals’ JSS investments, it is important to ex-
ploit societal-level variation while keeping country-level variation constant.
This way we can net out the informational mechanisms discussed above
from the more general institutional and policy effects operating at the na-
tional level.10
10For a more general discussion of the methodological difficulties inherent in the estima-
tion of contextual effects, see Blalock (1984), Hannan (1992), DiPrete and Forristal (1994),
and Achen and Shively (1995).
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I draw on the second round of the European Social Survey, ESS-2, car-
ried out between 2004 and 2005. The ESS-2 constitutes a particularly well-
American Journal of Sociologysuited data set for the testing of social interaction effects on JSS investments
for the following reasons. First, the ESS-2 allows us to exploit Europe’s great
intranational diversity as a means to test for the hypothesized social influ-
ences, which are expected to operate within country-specific policy and wel-
fare configurations. Europe offers very high levels of within-country regional
variation for the three contextual effects of interest (see tables A1 and A2 in
the appendix). Second, geographical mobility of country nationals is infre-
quent in Europe. The average regional mobility of the total EU-15 popula-
tion in 2006was 1%, a figure that is less than half the rate found in theUnited
States (see Bonin et al. 2008, p. 27). Low mobility across social contexts is an
important requisite when testing social influences.11 Third, the ESS-2 con-
tains unusually detailed information on job characteristics, including several
indicators of the specific skill content of respondents’ jobs, which are essen-
tial to this study. Finally, the ESS-2 provides very complete information on
individual attitudes, preferences, and tastes regarding both the domestic and
the market spheres.
The ESS-2 data set contains information for over 45,600 individuals re-
siding in 24 different European countries.12 All countries are subdivided into
several regional units with the exception of Luxembourg and Iceland, which
are single-region countries. The total number of regions in the data set is
234. Most countries are 4%–5% of the total sample each. Empirical models
capitalize on the cross-country and the cross-region, within-country varia-
tion offered by the ESS. The analytical sample at the individual level is re-
stricted to active respondents between 18 and 65 years of age who have
been employed for at least one year in their firms (N 5 23,798).
All macrolevel distributions for all key contextual independent variables
are calculated using the full sample size. I use roughly between 27,000 and
45,600 individual observations to compute the aggregate estimates for 234
different regions; 91% of respondents in the data set live in regions contain-
ing at least 50 observations. Regions containing fewer than 50 observations
are considered unreliable and have therefore been excluded from the analy-
sis. The average number of observations per valid region is 204.
11Low geographical mobility reduces aggregation bias (i.e., the possibility that individ-
uals are attracted to particular social contexts because of certain macrolevel characteris-
tics associated with the dependent variable).
12These countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and Ukraine. My data set does not include Turkey or Italy, which
are, however, available in the latest versions of the ESS-2. The Italian data set does not
include information on several crucial variables for testing the model. See http://www
.europeansocialsurvey.org/.
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In order to isolate the macrolevel effects of interest from other regional
characteristics, the models include various regional controls, which are ex-
Socially Embedded Investmentsplained below. Models are estimated both with and without controls for
preference heterogeneity. I expect to find significant societal-level effects on
women’s job-specific human capital investments net of differences in their
observed gender attitudes and orientations toward achievement. Such a
finding would constitute (indirect) evidence that the social structure can
shape women’s investment choices even if their observable preferences and
tastes converge with men’s.
VariablesIn the theoretical section of the article, job allocation decisions have been de-
fined as skill investment decisions over a discrete choice between two ideal
types of jobs or investment paths. Yet in practice the skill content of a partic-
ular job includes several dimensions that can be more accurately described
and measured using continuous indicators. Also in the real world, individ-
uals face not two but a whole range of jobs and occupations to choose from,
each of which entails different specific skill investment demands.
The ESS-2 includes three different indicators of the specific skill content
of respondents’ jobs: (1) job-specific learning time, which is measured as the
time that would be required for someone with the right qualifications to
learn to do the respondent’s jobwell (assessed by respondents);13 (2) whether
the respondent has attended a job skill training course in the last 12months;
and (3) the degree of agreement with the sentence “my job requires that I
keep learning new things.”14
The ESS-2 also reports respondents’ occupations using the four-digit In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations, ISCO-88. This classifi-
cation provides a very precise tool for organizing jobs into a clearly defined
set of groups according to the tasks and duties undertaken in the job (see
International Labor Organization 2011). I have added up and averaged the
standardized scores of the three different job-specific skill indicators pro-
vided by the ESS-2 for each of the 451 different occupations present in the
data set. The result is an index measuring the average job-specific skills re-
quired in a respondent’s occupation. The skill specialization index (JSSo)
ranges from22.45 to14.65, approximates a normal distribution, and shows
a Cronbach a of 0.8 (see the appendix).
There are significant differences in the mean JSSo scores of male and fe-
male respondents. Men’s mean JSSo score is 0.10, whereas women’s mean
13This is measured using an interval scale that ranges from 1 (less than aweek) to 8 (more
than two years).
14This is measured using a four-interval Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 4
(very true).
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JSSo score is 20.10 (difference 5 0.20; SE 5 0.008; t 5 24.10; Ha: diff ≠ 0,
probðjT j > jtjÞ5 :000). For illustrative purposes, table 1 lists the top 20 oc-
TABLE 1
The Top 20 Occupations According to Job-Specific Skill Investments ( JSSo)
ISCO-88 Occupations (4 Digits)
ISCO
Code
Average
JSS Score
Average Years
of Schooling
Riggers and cable splicers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7215 4.65 10
Aircraft engine mechanics and fitters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7232 2.86 12
Farming and forestry advisers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3213 2.75 13
Photographic products machine operators . . . . . . . . . . 8224 2.73 11
Service, shop, and market sales workers . . . . . . . . . . 5000 2.66 14
Hygienists, health environmental officers . . . . . . . . . . 3222 2.65 15
Well drillers, borers, and related workers. . . . . . . . . . 8113 2.54 11
Physicists, mathematicians, engineering
science professionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100 2.48 18
Mining engineers, metal and related professionals . . . . . 2147 2.34 14
Biologists, botanists, zoologists, and related
professionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2211 2.34 19
Appraisers, valuers, and auctioneers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3417 2.29 14
Film, stage, and related actors and directors . . . . . . . 2455 2.26 15
Dentists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2222 2.25 17
Medical doctors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2221 2.24 19
Electronics and telecommunications engineers . . . . . . 2144 2.20 16
Firefighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5161 2.20 12
Psychologists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2445 2.18 17
Legal professionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2420 2.17 17
Mathematicians and related professionals . . . . . . . . . 2121 2.1 17
Physicists, chemists, related professionals . . . . . . . . . . 2110 2.09 21
NOTE.—Data are from the second round of theEuropean Social Survey (2004–5). Entries are
calculated using responses on job-learning time, continuous learning, and incidence of job skill
training.
American Journal of Sociologycupations ranked according to this index. Although schooling is generally a
very strong predictor of JSSo scores, because of the complementarity be-
tween general skills and job specialization, it is worth noting that roughly
half of this list, including the very top, is made of occupations that do not
require high levels of formal education. Job-specific skills and formal edu-
cation are clearly two different dimensions of human capital. The correla-
tion between years of schooling and the JSSo score for the full sample is .45
(see table A1 in the appendix). Construct validity tests are provided in an
online supplement.
Correll (2001) shows that there are systematic differences in the way men
and women assess their degree of personal competence. Note that if men
andwomen also differed systematically in the evaluation of the skill content
of their jobs, usingmixed-sex samples to compute occupation-averaged spe-
cialization scores could yield biased estimates. In order to overcome this po-
tential problem, empiricalmodels are fitted to JSSo scores that are computed
using men’s responses only (Cronbach a 5 0.8). The correlation between
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men-informed JSSo scores and those obtained using the full sample is .9.15 As
a further robustness test, I have also computed an alternative index (JSSi)
Socially Embedded Investmentsthat combines the (previously standardized) responses to the three job skill
indicators directly rather than averaging at the occupation. The main em-
pirical findings of this study hold regardless of the indicator used (see the on-
line supplement). The actual formof the regressionmodels fitted to theESS-2
data is explained below. These regressions can be interpreted as modeling a
latent continuous variable that underlies the discrete investment decision
presented in the theoretical section of this article (Long 1997, pp. 40–47).
Individual-level variables of interests are age, schooling (in number of
years), migration status, marital status, number of children, and self-assessed
supply of housework (measured as the number of daily hours devoted to do-
mestic chores not including family care). All these individual-level variables
capture the standard human capital predictors of job investment behavior.
They reflect both early life experiences (e.g., education) and adult life events
(e.g., family formation) that are highly consequential for job specialization. In
addition, two attitudinal scales aimed at capturing preference heterogeneity
are used as controls. The first scale (P1)measures the degree of traditionalism
in respondents’ gender attitudes by combining responses to a host of Likert-
type attitudinal questions available in the ESS-2. It is normally distributed
and ranges from 210 to 110. The second scale (P2) measures orientations
toward “social success,” a dimension that is clearly different from gender at-
titudes (Schwartz andRubel 2005; Schwartz 2006). Such orientations include
ambition, competence, self-assertion, and the will to be recognized and ad-
mired for one’s achievements. The ambition scale combines responses to
these correlated orientations into a 10-interval scale that ranges from 25 to
15. Previous research has shown that men and women differ systematically
in their average levels of social ambition (Schwartz andRubel 2005) and also
that ambition, as measured by this scale, has a positive and significant im-
pact on individual earnings (Polavieja 2009). Estimating the effect of the so-
cial ambition scale offers an unusual opportunity to control for individual
characteristics that are very seldom observed.16 Detailed information about
the exact construction of these two scales is provided in the appendix.
I also control for the size and the industry of activity of respondents’ firms.
Large firms have larger internal markets, where the opportunities for JSS
15Gender differences inmean JSSo scores are considerably smallerwhen using onlymen’s
responses as the basis for calculation (women’s average JSSo 5 20.02; men’s average
JSSo510.01; difference5 0.0314; SE5 0.008;Ha: diff ≠ 0, probðjT j > jtjÞ5 :000).My
choice of indicator thus favors the null hypothesis that there are no gender differences in
specific investments.
16Gender attitudes and achievement orientations could be endogenous to JSS. For in-
stance, more ambitious people could make bigger claims about their jobs, whereas bad
employment experiences (reflected in lower JSS scores) could reinforce traditional val-
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enhancement should be greater. Similarly, economic activities that are in-
tensive in research or are exposed to rapid technological change should
American Journal of Sociologyincrease the demands and opportunities for skill specialization (see also
Tam 1997). Finally, industry dummies are expected to capture much of the
historical and organizational variation in social closure and gendered prac-
tices that are central to demand-side approaches (Tomaskovic-Devey and
Skaggs 2002, p. 123). For all these reasons it is important to include firm and
industry controls in the empirical models.
Contextual EffectsContextual indicators are measured at the regional level using the full ESS-2
sample as the basis for calculation (N5 45,681). In accordance with hypoth-
esis 1, it is expected that women extract particularly relevant information
from observing how different women’s investments are from men’s in the
preceding generation. I call this the social visibility of prior women’s invest-
ments (Vg;r). This concept is operationalized straightforwardly as the differ-
ence between the proportion of women in high-JSS occupations out of all
employed women and the proportion of men in high-JSS occupations out
of all employed men in the preceding generation at respondents’ region of
residence, r.17 This simple indicator provides a measure of social visibility
that is largely independent of the region’s occupational structure. All respon-
dents in the analytical sample are between 18 and 65 years of age, and they
are considered part of three different generations: those born between 1969
and 1986 (g5 3), those born between 1949 and 1968 (g5 2), and those born
between 1939 and 1948 (g5 1).18 High-JSS occupations have been defined
as those scoring one standard deviation above the sample mean, which cor-
responds to scores above the 70th percentile of the JSSo distribution (for al-
ternative definitions, see the online supplement). Hence,17The value ofV is positive for over 75% of all respondents in the full sample. That is, for
the majority of respondents, the previous generation showed a larger proportion of high-
JSS occupations among men than among women.
18The investment behavior of the preceding generation to those born between 1939 and
1948 cannot be properly observed in the data since the ESS-2 does not provide a sufficient
sample size for individuals born before 1939. Hence estimators for generation 1 have
been calculated adding up all the observations in the data set that are born before 1949,
which amounts to assuming that individuals from this cohort learned from the experiences
of their generational peers. It is important to note, however, that results hold even when
this generation is removed from the analysis (see the online supplement).
ues. Yet I use only attitudinal scales as a means to control for (observed) preference
heterogeneity, and this can be efficiently achieved with endogenous indicators.
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Socially Embedded InvestmentsVg; r5 N employedmg21; r
2
N employedwg21; r
;
g5 f1; 2; 3g; r5 f1; : : : ; 234g:
ð3Þ
Women’s investments are also expected to be informed by the propor-
tion of potential domestic cooperators in their marriage or partnership
markets (hypothesis 2). Women can infer such a consequential figure only
from observing the domestic behavior of already married or cohabiting
men of characteristics similar to those of their potentially marriageable
pool. For simplicity, only education and region are considered as defining
characteristics of marriage markets. Therefore, I posit that women should
extract relevant information from observing the domestic behavior of ed-
ucationally equivalent married men at their regions of residence.
Mydefinition of domestic cooperation is based on the observed survey dis-
tributions. Men are considered cooperative if they do approximately 40% or
more of theweekly housework,whereas “cooperative”women are defined as
those who do approximately two-thirds or more, as this ensures amore sym-
metric distribution of “cooperators” in both genders. For each sex, the re-
gional proportion of cooperators is calculated against the total number of
married or cohabiting peers (s5men, women; Cse;r).
19 Information for coop-
eration levels is self-reported and by definition is restricted to married and
cohabiting respondents (N 5 27,000). In order to maximize the number of
observations by regional cell, I have defined educational homogamy by dis-
tinguishing only two levels of education: below tertiary (e51) and tertiary
and above (e5 2), which account, respectively, for roughly 70% and 30% of
the analytical sample.20 Therefore,19TheESS-2 asks respondents what proportion of the total time devoted toweekly house-
work is spent by themselves but clusters responses into six categories (percentage for men
in parentheses): (1) none or almost none (27%); (2) up to a quarter (29%); (3) more than a
quarter, up to a half (30%); (4) more than a half, up to three-quarters (8%); (5) more than
three-quarters, less than all of the time (2%); and (6) all of the time (3%). Answers 3 and
above are considered cooperative men, and answers 4 and above are considered cooper-
ative women.
20Of male respondents, 63% are married or cohabiting, and 44% of them (claim to) do
more than one-fourth up to one-half of the weekly housework or more. This figure goes
down to 42% for husbands without tertiary education and up to 48% for those with ter-
tiary education. Results are robust to fitting the estimations on respondents living in re-
gions with more than 150 individual observations (114 regions) and regions with more
than 300 individual observations (40 regions). This suggests that estimates for domestic
cooperation are not driven by small regional sample sizes (see the online supplement).
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;
e5 f1; 2g; r5 f1; : : : ; 234g; s5 fmen;womeng:
ð4Þ
Finally, hypothesis 3 is tested by calculating the average number of chil-
dren born to same-sex peers with the same educational level as respondents
and living in the same region (Fe;r). This figure is expected to capture the fer-
tility norms prevailing in respondents’ social environments. Having fertil-
ity information for the full sample allows greater precision in the definition
of educational groups. Consequently, I now distinguish between three edu-
cational levels, primary, secondary and tertiary education, as a means to
identify educational peers:21
Fe;r5
N childrense;r
N se;r
;
e5 f1; 2; 3g; r5 f1; : : : ; 234g; s5 fmen; womeng:
ð5Þ
Note that the three regional-level distributions of interest could be corre-
latedwith other regional attributes possibly affecting JSSo scores, such as the
structure of demand, the existing levels of general human capital, regional
economic conditions, and other institutional influences affecting women’s
activity rates. In order to net out the effect of the hypothesized mechanisms
from these other possible sources of contextual influence, the models control
for the following contextual variables: the regional urbanization rate, the av-
erage years of schooling of the typical worker at the respondent’s region, re-
gional unemployment levels, regional female participation rates, and the av-
erage score of the specialization index in the respondent’s industry at the
respondent’s region of residence.
Table 2 describes the main variables used in the empirical analysis. Cor-
relation matrices and variance tests are presented in the appendix (see ta-
bles A1 and A2). These tests show that the correlation coefficients for the
three macrolevel variables of interest are very low, whereas the levels of
variance for the outcome variable and the main individual-level predictors
have very similar magnitudes across different regional types. These tests
provide a high degree of confidence that the estimates for social influences
will not be biased by regional-level collinearity.21Results are also robust to using two educational groups as peer identifiers (available on
request).
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Specification
American Journal of SociologyI estimate linear regression models. The dependent variable is the average
specific skills required in respondents’ occupation, and asmentioned above,
it is measured using male responses only as a means to avoid gender bias in
self-assessment. Specifically, JSSo(i, r, c) is the occupation skill score of in-
dividual i living in region r and country c.My preferred specificationmodels
individual variation in JSSo employing several regressions of the form
JSSosi;r;c5a
s
c 1 b
s
1Xi;r;c 1 g
s
1g;r;c
Vg;r;c 1 g
s
2e;r;c
Ce;r;c 1 g
s
3e;r;c
Fe;r;c 1 d
s
r;cZr;c
1 vsi;r;cAi;r;c 1 ε
s
i;r;c;
ð6Þ
where the right-hand side contains country-specific intercepts; a vector of
individual and firm-level controls, Xi;r;c; the three hypothesized social influ-
ences, which are captured by the coefficients g1, g2, and g3; vector Zr;c, which
contains all the regional controls explained above; and, finally, vector Ai;r;c,
which includes individual-level coefficients for each of the two attitudinal
scales used to account for preference heterogeneity (i.e., gender role attitudes
and the degree of social ambition). Models testing for social influences are
run separately for each sex (results for men are shown in the appendix).
Equation (6) is a regression model with country fixed effects and regional
clustering of robust standard errors. Regional clustering accounts for possible
unobserved regional effects on JSS, whereas country fixed effects capture
larger national influences on job specialization. By using fixed effects, we
control for national differences in labor market, training, and equal oppor-
tunity policies, as well as for differences in all those policies and institutions
that promotewomen’s employment. Fixed effects also absorb country differ-
ences in technology, the size of the public sector, or the prevalence of voca-
tional education, all of which should affect women’s opportunities for job
specialization (see, e.g., Grimshaw et al. 1999; Estevez-Abe 2005, 2006).
The proposedmodel specification can be viewed as a reduction of a three-
level hierarchical linear model to a two-dimensional equivalent with no loss
of information. The model deals with variation at level 2 via clustering of
errors at the region while still accounting for variation at level 3 via country
fixed effects. This specification can provide robust estimates for social influ-
ences while being less demanding on the data structure than its three-level
hierarchical linear model counterpart. A further virtue of this specification
is that it does not require making any assumption as to whether higher-level
units are a random draw of a larger hypothetical population of regions and
countries (see, e.g., Snijders and Bosker 1999; Halaby 2004; Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal 2008, pp. 437–38).22
22Results are, however, highly comparable to those obtained using a three-level hierar-
chical linear model (available on request).
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FINDINGS
TABLE 3
Country Fixed-Effect Regressions on the Job Skill Score (JSSo), Pooled Models
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Female. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.103*** 2.076*** 2.090***
(.014) (.015) (.015)
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .005*** .005*** .005***
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Schooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104*** .103*** .099***
(.003) (.003) (.004)
Migrant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.136*** 2.144*** 2.135***
(.038) (.038) (.039)
Married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109*** .119***
(.011) (.011)
Number of children . . . . . . 2.018*** 2.016***
(.005) (.005)
Supply of housework . . . . . 2.021*** 2.019***
(.004) (.004)
Gender attitudes (P1) . . . . . 2.020***
(.003 )
Social ambition (P2) . . . . . . .029***
(.003 )
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.485*** 21.482*** 21.476***
(.062) (.063) (.066)
Observations . . . . . . . . . . . 22,779 22,287 22,287
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .217 .220 .227
NOTE.—Entries are calculated by the author from the second round of the European Social
Survey (2004–5). JSS scores are calculated from only men’s responses. Robust SEs (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the regional level. The sample includes only active individuals between
18 and 65 years of age. Respondents with less than one year of job tenure or living in regions
with fewer than 50 observations are excluded.Migration status ismeasured as citizenship.Mod-
els include controls for firms’ size and industry of activity.
* P < .10.
** P < .05.
*** P < .01.
Socially Embedded InvestmentsTable 3 pools male and female respondents together in order to estimate the
average gender differences in their JSSo scores. Model 1 shows that Euro-
peanworkingwomen are employed in occupationswith lower average JSSo
scores than comparable men (b520.103; t527.35; P5 :000). This is net
of age, years of schooling, migration status, size of the firm, and industry of
activity (the latter two not shown). Model 2 adds controls for marital status,
number of children, and supply of housework. Married respondents show
higher average JSSo scores, a finding that holds for both men and women
when fitting the models separately by sex (see table 4 and app. table A3). In
contrast, children and housework supply both reduce average JSSo scores.
The effect of having children is entirely driven by women’s experiences,
whereas the effect of housework supply works for both men and women
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(see table 4 and app. table A3). Family and career investments are highly
endogenous, and hence I make no strong claims about the direction of cau-
American Journal of Sociologysality at this point (but see the online supplement). Note that accounting for
family variables reduces the gender coefficient (b 5 20.076; t 5 24.96;
P5 :000). Finally, model 3 introduces gender attitudes (P1) and social am-
bition (P2) to the previous equation. As expected, individuals holding more
traditional gender attitudes show lower JSSo scores whereas more ambi-
tious individuals score higher. These effects hold when models are fitted
separately by sex (see table 4 and app. table A3). Note that controlling for
observed preference heterogeneity does not reduce average gender differ-
ences in JSSo scores (b 5 20.09; t 5 26.00; P5 :000).
Table 4 presents the results of fitting different sequences of equation
(6) to the female sample using our preferred specification. Social influences
are tested both with and without attitudinal controls, first separately (mod-
els 1–6) and then simultaneously (models 7 and 8). All models control for the
regional characteristics described above. Results are largely consistent with
the theoretical expectations.
Models 1 and 2 in table 4 show that the degree of social visibility of prior
women’s JSS investments is significantly correlated with posterior levels of
job specialization.As expected, the lower the visibility ofwomen in high-JSS
occupations in a given generation, the lower the individual JSSo scores of
women in the next. This effect is significant at the 95% level before introduc-
ing controls for preference heterogeneity (g1 5 20.13; t 5 22.31; P5 :022)
and remains unaffected after (g1 5 20.14; t 5 22.41; P5 :017). This sug-
gests that observed preferences are not the path connecting previous gener-
ational experiences to current JSSo scores. These findings are therefore con-
sistent with cold social learning effects. Results also hold when all three
social influences are tested simultaneously (see models 7 and 8).
The social visibility of prior women in high-JSS occupations is a cohort-
specific variable. To better gauge the magnitude of its impact, I first cal-
culate the marginal effect that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile
of the regional distribution of social visibility of the oldest generation has
on the job specialization scores of women born in the next, keeping the rest
of the variables of the model constant at their means. Then I compare this
estimate to the effect of an equivalent change in the individual distribution
of schooling. Schooling raises no questions about the direction of causality,
and it is by far the strongest predictor of JSSo scores. This makes it a par-
ticularly useful benchmark.
The 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the regional distribution of JSS
gaps for the oldest generation (i.e., those born between 1938 and 1948) are,
respectively, 0.12, 0.21, and 0.28. The difference between the 25th and the
75th percentiles is therefore20.16 points. According to the estimates of the
full-specification model (model 8), a 0.16-point reduction of the gender gap
616
in JSS in the 1938–48 generation would increase the average JSSo scores of
women born between 1949 and 1968 by 0.03 points. This is about one-tenth
Socially Embedded Investmentsof the effect of moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the schooling
distribution and amounts to increasing women’s education by roughly five
months. The size of this estimated effect corresponds to the difference in spe-
cialized skills observed between, for example, plumbers and pipe fitters
(JSSo5 0.45) and industrial machinery mechanics (JSSo5 0.48). Marginal
effects for other selected variables are presented in table 5.
Table 4 also shows that the proportion of cooperative men in women’s
marriage or partnershipmarkets is positively correlatedwithwomen’s JSSo
scores. This correlation is significant at the 99% level both before controlling
for attitudinal heterogeneity (model 3: g25 0.32; t5 3.32; P5 :001) and af-
ter (model 4: g25 0.29; t5 3.14; P5 :002). The effect of male cooperators in
women’s marriage markets also remains significant at the 99% level when
all social influences are tested simultaneously, both with and without atti-
tudinal controls. Note that there is only a very slight reduction in the g2 co-
efficient after controlling for preference heterogeneity (model 7: g2 5 0.30;
t5 3.15; P5 :002; model 8: g25 0.28; t5 2.96; P5 :003). I have posited that
since job investment decisions often precede family formation, the aggre-
gated effects of men’s domestic cooperation should leave an observable
trace in women’s careers, regardless of their own (posterior) family behav-
ior. Results are fully consistent with this expectation. Further tests confirm
that these effects are not driven by endogenous household specialization (see
the online supplement).
According to the estimates of the full model, “moving” from the 25th to
the 75th percentile of the distribution of male domestic cooperation (which
amounts to moving from a social context in which 34% of men cooperate
to one in which 57% of men cooperate) increases women’s JSSo scores by
0.06 points. This is one-fifth of the effect of an equivalent percentile change
in schooling, and it amounts to increasing women’s education by 10months.
Such an impact corresponds to the difference in specialized skills observed be-
tween, for instance, insurance representatives (JSSo 5 0.95) and civil en-
gineers (JSSo 5 1.02). The effect of men’s domestic cooperation is the larg-
est of the three macrolevel influences considered in this study.
The results reported in table 4 are also consonant with the expectation
that high fertility contexts discourage women’s job-specific investments.
The net effect of fertility norms, which are measured as the aggregate fer-
tility behavior of educationally homogamous peers, is significant above
the 99% level when the variable is tested alone, both before controlling for
gender attitudes and the degree of social ambition (model 5: g3520.11; t5
23.29; P5 :001) and after (model 6: g3520.10; t523.17; P5 :002). This
effect also remains significant at the 99% levelwhen all contextual effects are
tested simultaneously, both before and after introducing attitudinal controls
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(model 7: g3520.09; t522.91; P5 :004; model 8: g3520.08; t522.79;
P5 :006). Note again that controlling for observed preference heterogene-
Socially Embedded Investmentsity yields only a very slight reduction in the g3 coefficient. This suggests that
if aggregate fertility behavior has an impact onwomen’s internalized norms,
this impact is only very poorly captured by our attitudinal scales. Finally, it
must be noted that the introduction of fertility norms in the models reduces
the effect of women’s own fertility behavior. Conversely, if fertility behavior
is removed, the effect of fertility norms increases by 23 percentage points
(available on request).23 (Issues of endogeneity are treated in the online sup-
plement.)
According to the estimates of the full specification model, increasing the
social fertility norm from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the regional dis-
tribution (i.e., from 1.3 to 1.8 children) decreases women’s JSSo scores by
0.04 points. This is about one-eighth of the effect of an equivalent percen-
tile change in schooling and amounts to reducing women’s education by
six months. Such an effect corresponds to the difference observed between,
for example, administrative secretaries (JSSo5 0.00) and optometrists and
opticians (JSSo 5 0.04).
Robustness tests.—Although all the regressions fitted to the female sample
include a host of regional controls, the possibility that the social influences
observed for women are actually picking up the effect of some other unob-
served regional characteristic possibly correlated with the average levels of
JSSo cannot be fully ruled out. Note, however, that if the social effects found
for women were spuriously driven by omitted variable bias at the regional
level, they should also be found for men. Yet none of the social effects consid-
ered in this study has any significant impact on men’s JSSo scores, regard-
less of how they enter in the equation (see app. table A3). This latter finding
constitutes crucial evidence that the social influences observed in the female
sample are not an artifact of unobserved regional characteristics.
Numerous other tests have been carried out to further confirm the robust-
ness of the empirical findings. These tests include changes in the operation-
alization of key variables, changes in the model specification, and the in-
troduction of controls for individual and regional-level religiosity, regional
gender norms, and perceived discrimination. I have also tested that the es-
timates for JSS gaps in the preceding generation are not artificially driven by
regional differences in unobserved levels of discrimination and social clo-
sure. This I have done by checking whether the individual JSS scores of
womenbelonging to older generations are significantly “affected”by the gen-
der gaps in JSS observed in the younger ones. Reassuringly, they are not.24
23The interplay between preferences, fertility behavior, and career investments cannot,
however, be fully spelled out using cross-sectional data.Generations cannot possibly learn from the future. Hence finding that the gender gaps
JSS of the older generations are “affected” by the access to high-JSS occupations in the
61924
in
Finally, I have checked that the effects of macrolevel fertility and male do-
mestic behavior are not biased by endogenous fertility and household spe-
American Journal of Sociologycialization. This has been done by reestimating the models on a subsample
of young single respondents without children. By construction, the JSS in-
vestments of such a restricted sample cannot be an artifact of endogenous
specialization. Results are robust across all these different tests, which are
available in the online supplement.
DISCUSSIONInvesting in job-specific skills increases advancement opportunities in both
firms and labor markets, including opportunities for wage growth (see, e.g.,
Veum 1997; Loewenstein and Spletzer 1999). According to several studies,
JSS could account for most of the statistical effect of occupational sex com-
position on earnings, as well as for a nontrivial part of the unexplained com-
ponent of the gender wage gap (see Tam 1997; Tomaskovic-Devey and
Skaggs 2002; Manning and Swaffield 2008; Polavieja 2008, 2009). Under-
standing the determinants of gender differences in job-specific skills seems,
therefore, a crucial task for gender stratification research. I have argued
that social interaction models can bring new insights into this highly conse-
quential question.
Tomy knowledge, this is the first article to study social interaction effects
on job-specific skill investments. By stressing the idea that choice under
uncertainty brings the social structure to the fore of investment decisions,
I have actually posited that gender differences in job-specific skills could
be reproduced even in the face of both declining discrimination and prefer-
ence convergence between the sexes. Steep tenure-compensation profiles,
which are typical of jobs requiring high specific skills, make women’s in-
vestment decisions particularly dependent on their social context and, in so
doing, produce a sort of self-inflicted statistical discrimination on the supply
side.
This is a novel explanation of gender differences in labor market perfor-
mance,which should by nomeans bemistaken for blaming the victim.Quite
on the contrary, by spelling out how macrolevel constraints and distribu-
tions can affectmicrolevel behavior under uncertainty, the theoreticalmodel
developed in this study highlights the structural character of gender inequal-
ity. It also provides an explanation that is based on precise and testable
mechanisms, as it has been authoritatively called for by Reskin (2003).
younger ones would be a strong indication that our generational effects were spurious.
Any unobserved regional characteristic simultaneously affecting individual JSSo levels
and generational gaps (e.g., unobserved and persistent discrimination) could lead to such
spurious correlation. I thank an anonymous reviewer of the AJS for suggesting this inge-
nious robustness test.
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Contextual influences on job skill investments have been modeled for a
representative sample of economically active adult Europeans using the re-
Socially Embedded Investmentsgional gender gaps in access to high-investment occupations in the preceding
generation, the regional distribution of cooperative partners in their mar-
riage markets, and the regional fertility rates of educationally homoga-
mous peers. Country fixed-effects regressions with robust standard errors
clustered at the regional level show that these three macrolevel variables
are significantly associated with women’s levels of job specialization while
having no significant impact on men’s, net of age, schooling, firms’ indus-
try, firms’ size, and a host of attitudinal and regional-level controls. This is
interpreted as strong evidence of social interaction effects.
This study has significant implications for both research and theory. First,
it suggests that women can learn from the labor market experiences of pre-
ceding generations, a result that is in line with previous studies (see, e.g.,
Breen and Garcia-Penalosa 2002; Fernández 2007). Finding evidence that
women learn from the past has implications for discrimination theory. In any
given generation, discrimination reduces the social visibility of women in
highly specialized jobs. This implies that, in the next generation, womenwill
take this visibility as a signal for their own survival prospects. What started
as a demand-side phenomenon can thus be transformed into a supply-side
one over time. The theoretical model developed in this study can help ex-
plain the enduring effects of discrimination and, in doing so, provide a use-
ful bridge between demand-side and supply-side explanations of gender
inequality. This in turn has interesting public policy implications. Most
anti–labor market discrimination policies across the industrialized world
focus on the costs of discrimination for individual workers. This study sug-
gests that firm-level discrimination could also have significant public costs
due to its signaling effects.
Second, this study shows that women can learn from the macrolevel dis-
tribution of housework and the fertility norms prevailing in their societies.
Previous research has found that household behavior can have significant
spillover effects on women’s careers (see, e.g., Han andMoen 1999; Hersch
and Stratton 2002; Maume 2006; Cunningham 2008; Treas and Drobnic
2010). The evidence presented in this study suggests that such spillover ef-
fects could be much larger than hitherto considered since what families do
inside their households not only affects their own members but also serves
as a social signal for others. By focusing on the socially embedded nature of
investment choices, this study highlights the social consequences of seem-
ingly private behavior, a crucial question that has been previously over-
looked.
More specifically, the findings reported here suggest that equalizing the so-
cial distribution of family responsibilities and domestic chores will most
probably be beneficial to all women, including those who have not formed
621
their families yet (see further the online supplement). Furthermore, this study
suggests that such equalization is likely to be Pareto improving, as it will en-
American Journal of Sociologyhance women’s career investments without necessarily hindering men’s.
Finally, this study helps explain why gender inequality in occupational
choices tends to persist over time despite strong equalizing trends in sev-
eral other societal realms. This question of persistence has been convinc-
ingly posed byCharles andGrusky (2004). Their own answer focuses on the
combination of two structural factors: gender essentialism (i.e., the cultural
belief that men and women are essentially different and possess different
skills and capabilities) and postindustrial economic restructuring (see also
Charles 2005; Charles and Bradley 2009). This study has placed the analyt-
ical focus much closer to the individual and her immediate social context.
Evidence that these proximate social contexts shape individuals’ rational
job investment choices provides a complementary explanation of the persis-
tence of occupational gender segregation.
The effects of macrolevel structures over microlevel choices considered in
this study are situationalmechanisms (Coleman 1986). The theoreticalmodel
presented explains how situational mechanisms affect women’s JSS invest-
ments by influencing their job survival expectations in a context of gender-
specific uncertainty. This explanation is fully consistent with the view of
gender as a pervasive multilevel system of difference and inequality that is
reproduced via social interactions (see Ridgeway and Correll 2004), as well
as with the view of actors as rational individuals, which forms the basis of
economic thinking.
Note, however, that the rationality requirements of the proposed ap-
proach need not be strong. The idea that uncertainty and information
constraints make individual choices more context dependent can be met
by rationality assumptions of all strengths (for a discussion, see Boudon
[1996] and Goldthorpe [2000, chap. 6]). What is important, in my view,
is to provide belief formation approaches with microlevel foundations as
a means to better identify the mechanisms of social influence. For this, it
is particularly useful, if not essential, to assume some form of rationality,
however weak or bounded this may be. The theoretical model developed
in this study both complements and conciliates economic and sociological
approaches by connecting investment choices to the social structure.
APPENDIXThe Dependent Variable
The JSSo score is calculated by combining the occupational averages for
job-learning time, continuous learning requirements of the job, and inci-622
dence of skill training into one single scale. Possible gender biases in skill
assessment are accounted for by using male responses only. The average in-
FIG. A1.—Average JSS scores of respondent’s occupation: values calculatedusingonly
men’s responses. Data are from the second round of theEuropean Social Survey (2004–5).
Socially Embedded Investmentsteritem correlation of the resulting scale is .54, and its reliability coefficient
(Cronbach’s a) is 0.78. The distribution of the JSSo score is presented in fig-
ure A1. (Validity tests for this variable are provided in the online supple-
ment.)
Construction of the Gender Traditionalism and Social Ambition ScalesGender attitudes are measured by computing respondents’ degree of agree-
ment with the following five Likert-type items: (1) whether women should be
prepared to cut down on their wages for the sake of their families, (2) whether
men should have domestic responsibilities equal to those ofwomen, (3)whether
men should have preference over scarce jobs, (4) whether parents should
stick together for children even if they do not get along, and (5) whether a
person’s family should be his or her priority. The scale shows a Cronbach’s
a of 0.6; it is normally distributed and ranges from 210 to 110, the latter
value implying themost “traditional” gender attitudes.Women show signif-
icantly fewer traditional attitudes than men.
The second attitudinal control (P2) measures orientations toward social
success, a dimension that is clearly different from gender attitudes (Schwartz
and Rubel 2005; Schwartz 2006; Polavieja 2009). Such orientations include
ambition, competence, self-assertion, and the will to be recognized and
admired for one’s achievements. The scale is constructed in two steps.
First, factor analysis is applied to a set of attitudinal questions from the623
Human Value module of the ESS-2. In this module, respondents are pre-
sented with several descriptions of fictitious individuals and are asked to
American Journal of Sociologyevaluate how much alike they consider themselves to be in relation to the
examples described (examples are chosen so as to have the same sex as re-
spondents). Factor analysis showed that responses to the following descrip-
tions did actually form part of a single factor (results available on request):
(1) Being very successful is important to her. She hopes that people will rec-
ognize her achievements. (2) It is important to her to show her abilities. She
wants people to admirewhat she does. (3) It is important to her to get respect
from others. She wants people to do what she says. Responses to these de-
scriptions were added up in a 10-interval scale ranging from25 to15. The
scale showed a Cronbach’s a of 0.7.
Correlation and Dispersion Analysis for the Main Variables of InterestA crucial characteristic of the European data structure is the very low cor-
relations found between the three contextual influences of interest. Several
reasons explain why these correlations are so low. First, we find high gender
gaps in JSS in many European regions where both domestic cooperation
and fertility levels are also high. This is typical of Scandinavian regions.
Scandinavian societies combine high levels of de-familiarization, including
high domestic cooperation, with high levels of fertility and high occupa-
tional sex segregation (and also high gender gaps in JSS; see, e.g., Mandel
and Semyonov 2005; Estevez-Abe 2006). Conversely, fertility levels are ex-
tremely low in many regions belonging to the most “traditional” countries,
where domestic cooperation is also very low. This is particularly the case in
southern European regions (see Billari and Kohler 2004). As a result, in
Europe gender gaps in JSS, fertility levels, and domestic cooperation are
poorly correlated at the national level and even more poorly correlated at
the regional level. This is actually optimal for estimation purposes.
Correlationmatrices andvariance tests are presented in tablesA1 andA2.
These tests show that the correlation coefficients for the three macrolevel
variables of interest are indeed very low, whereas the levels of variance for
the outcome variable and the main individual-level predictors have a very
similar magnitude across different regional types. These tests provide a
high degree of confidence that the estimates for social influences reported
on table 4 are not biased by regional-level collinearity.
Testing Social Interactions on MenTable A3 shows the results of replicating the models of table 4 on the male
sample. Note that none of the social interaction effects of interest has any
significant impact on individual levels of job specialization, regardless of
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how they enter in the equation. This strongly suggests that the contextual
estimates found in the female sample are not an artifact of unobserved re-
American Journal of Sociologygional characteristics.
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